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Abstract 
This article outlines, through a number of examples, a method that can be used by autonomous 
agents to decide among potential messages to send to other agents, without having to assume that 
a message must be truthful and that it must be believed by the hearer. The main idea is that com- 
municative behavior of autonomous agents is guided by the principle of economic rationality, 
whereby agents transmit messages to increase the effectiveness of interaction measured by their 
expected utilities. We are using a recursive, decision-theoretic formalism that allows agents to 
model each other and to infer the impact of a message on its recipient. The recursion can be con- 
tinued into deeper levels, and agents can model the recipient modeling the sender in an effort to 
assess the truthfulness of the received message. We show how our method often allows the agents 
to decide to communicate in spite of the possibility that the messages will not be believed. In 
certain situations, on the other hand, our method shows that the possibility of the hearer not be- 
lieving what it hears makes communication useless. Our method thus provides the rudiments of a 
theory of how honesty and trust could emerge through rational, selfish behavior. 
Key words: distributed artificial intelligence, rational communication, multiagent systems, deci- 
sion making, agent modeling, belief 
1. Introduction 
Agents that are fully autonomous should be able to freely choose among all ac- 
t ions-physical  and communicative--available to them. The challenge in design- 
ing such systems, though, is to develop the theories and methods needed by the 
autonomous systems to use their capabilities rationally. In this article we extend 
the method presented in Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and Wehe (1991a) to allow an 
agent to choose rationally what to communicate to another agent, without the 
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assumption that the transmitted information has to be truthful, and is guaranteed 
to be believed. The communicating agent, therefore, has to consider that blatant 
lies could be easily detected and therefore are not likely to be believed. Sending 
such messages thus could make no sense. In fact, sometimes truthful messages 
might be unbelievable, and sending them could be irrational, too. On the other 
hand, some lies might be believable, or at least could force the hearer to change 
its actions regardless of whether it believes them or not. The goal of the speaking 
agent is to choose to send messages that will impact the hearer to the speaker's 
advantage. Assessing whether messages, true or false, will be believed is thus 
important to the speaker. 
A fundamental paradigm underlying our approach is that autonomous intelligent 
agents use the principle of maximization of their subjective expected utility in all 
of their purposeful undertakings. This paradigm is a centra! one in utility theory, 
decision theory, and game theory, on which we draw in our work. Our adopting 
the utilitarian paradigm absolves us from considering more specific issues: for 
instance, whether robots should lie, when, or whether they should be gullible. 
Our aim is to ensure that they be rational whatever they do. If lying is rational, 
so be it. 
What we find interesting is to understand why rational, selfish agents would 
ever choose to tell the truth, believe in what they hear, or even communicate at 
all, without the external imposition of a protocol (Zlotkin and Rosenschein 19911~ 
or incentives (Ephrati and Rosenschein 1991) that force them to be honest. 
Clearly, among people, honesty and trust can emerge among friends, while de- 
ception and disbelief often predominate among adversaries. Our motivation is to 
understand how rational decisions among these options are made, and possibly 
what their social implications are (see section 6). Our study also has practical 
importance for designing autonomous agents that can function in adversarial sit- 
uations, such as competitive markets and battlefields. 
The issue of lies in communication has recently been addressed in the Distrib- 
uted AI literature by Zlotkin and Rosenschein (1989, 1990, 1991). In their work, 
Zlotkin and Rosenchein analyze the use of lies in negotiation and conflict reso- 
lution in various domains. They study how preestablished negotiation protocols, 
for particular domains, can ensure that agents will not lie. We, on the other hand, 
do not assume a prearranged protocol. They also suggest a taxonomy that divides 
lies into false information about the broadcasting agent itself or false information 
about the sender's future actions. This distinction is essentially identical to our 
examination of lies in modeling and intentional messages in this article. Unlike 
our work, however, they do not consider the reciprocal issue of whether a mes- 
sage recipient should believe what it hears. 
The complications created by the possibility of dishonest communication have 
also been analyzed in the economics literature (Mayerson 1988). There, issues of 
designing a communication system that optimizes the information exchanged by 
rational agents are discussed. A number of these issues are identical to the ones 
we are dealing with, but the emphasis is on the communication channel design, 
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as opposed to the decision making of the individual agents motivated by maxi- 
mization of the expected utility of the messages exchanged. 
Our approach is based on the Recursive Modeling Method (RMM) (Gmytra- 
siewicz, Durfee, and Wehe 1991b), and on our analysis of how communication 
transforms the RMM hierarchy (Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and Wehe 1991a) (out- 
lined also in the next section), which is intended to be a complete representation 
of an agent's knowledge relevant to the decision-making process in a multiagent 
environment. As in our earlier work, the main guideline to solve the problem is 
the recursive use of the intentionality assumption, that is, the assumption that 
other agents are rational and seek to maximize their expected utility. To evaluate 
the utility of a message, the sender of the message will attempt to predict if the 
receiver will believe it or not. The receiver, on the other hand, will attempt to 
guess if the sender was transmitting the truth. The intentionality assumption ap- 
plied by the receiver to the sender will then be used to answer the question of  
whether it would pay for the sender to lie. We get here a recursive pattern on the 
communicative level, and the resulting recursive hierarchy, which we call a com- 
munication hierarchy, can be solved by methods similar to those used in the case 
of recursive hierarchies containing physical actions, called action hierarchies and 
analyzed in Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and Wehe (1991a, 199Ib). However, as it 
turns out, each of the recursive levels of communicative options of the agents 
requires solution of at least one action hierarchy, as opposed to the solution of a 
single payoff matrix in action hierarchies. In addition, solving a communication 
hierarchy introduces the notion of playing against "nature" as we shall see, which 
fundamentally changes the analysis such that some forms of ambiguity--whether 
the hearer should believe the speaker, for example--might be impossible to re- 
solve definitively. 
As in our previous work, the evaluation of the utility of a message, M, will be 
based on the following equation: 
tY~M) = U~M(r)-  U~(X). (1) 
This equation expresses the utility of a message, M, as the difference between 
the expected utility, Up(X), of the best action, X, before sending the message, and 
the expected utility, UpM(Y), of the preferred action, I7, after the message was sent. 
In the remainder of the article, we first illustrate the basic concepts and com- 
plications introduced by the possibility of the hearer not believing a message, 
using a simple and intuitive example (section 2). Then, we consider the utility of 
lying in messages that describe the environment, which we call modeling mes- 
sages, using an example of a lie that pays off, and one that does not (section 3). 
We go on to discuss the issues of lies and belief in messages describing the inten- 
tions of the speaker, called intentional messages (section 4). We show how the 
possibility of the messages being dishonest and not believed can lead to the agents 
not engaging in communication at all, using the example of the Prisoner's Di- 
lemma (section 5). We do not consider the issues of lying and belief in the cases 
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of acknowledging messages, questions, and imperatives in this paper. The diffi- 
culties introduced by communication channel unreliability are also ignored for 
simplicity. 
2. A simple example 
In this example we will consider a simple modeling message that can be ex- 
changed between two agents. As we mentioned, modeling messages contain in- 
formation about the environment in which the interaction takes place or about the 
properties of the agents involved. Let us consider the example of the two inter- 
acting agents with two goals in the environment, valuable to both of the agents, 
as depicted in Figure 1. We will assume in the following analysis that the agents 
cannot see through walls, which is common knowledge. 
Let us consider agent RI contemplating the value of the following modeling 
message MI: "There is GI '  behind the wall," intended for agent R2. Our analysis 
will use a number of payoff matrices. The payoffs in these matrices are computed 
as a sum of the values of all of the performed goals minus the cost personally 
incurred in the process by the individual agents. For example, if R1 pursues GI '  
and R2 pursues G1, then the payofffor R1 is (2 + 2) - 2 = 2. The labels G1 and 
GI'  of tows and columns stand for the goals GI and GI'  the agents may pursue, 
while S stands for the option "stay still or do something else." To make our ex- 
ample concrete for the reader interested in the quantitative calculations, we rep- 
resent the views of interactions in terms of payoff matrices in this article. Readers 
interested in a qualitative understanding need not be concerned with the specific 
values in these matrices. 
P~I, is the payoff matrix describing Rl 's decision-making situation: 
R1 
R2 
G1 GI'  S 
G1 1 3 1 
GI'  2 0 0 
S 2 2 0 
Let pR2 be R2's payoff matrix describing the situation in which R2 does not 
know about the goal G1 ': 
R1 
GI S 
R2 G1 0 0 
S 2 0 
Note that the pm matrix also describes the case in which R2 has received the 
message M1 but decided not to believe it, since, if R2 does not believe M1, it still 
does not believe that GI'  exists. 
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Figure 1. Example scenario. 
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R 1  G1  1 1 
S 2 0 
Finally, let us denote by m Pc,~', the payoff matrix describing R2 knowing about 
GI' :  
R 2  
R 1  
G1 GI'  S 
G1 1 3 1 
GI '  2 0 0 
S 2 2 0 
With these matrices, R1 can build the recursive hierarchy (Gmytrasiewicz, Dur- 
fee, and Wehe 1991b) before communication takes place, shown in Figure 2. R1 
knows that R2 does not see Gl '  and models it on the second level using the matrix 
pR2 R1, thinking that R2 is unaware of GI ' ,  models R2's model of Rl 's  decision 
making without GI ' ,  that is, using the matrix pR~ on the third level. The rest of 
the levels are constructed in a similar way. Thus, the goal GI '  is not present at all 
on the lower levels of the hierarchy in Figure 2. Agent R1 can easily solve this 
hierarchy (Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and Wehe 1991b) by propagating the infor- 
mation in the hierarchy bottom-up (starting from any level below the second in 
this case). Let us say that we use the hierarchy ending with the matrix pRJ. If we 
look no further down, then R1 should consider either of R2's moves as equally 
likely, so R1 should expect equivalent average payoffs for either of its moves. 
Propagating this conclusion up the hierarchy, R2 would consider either of Rl 's  
moves as equally likely in the matrix pro, and will thus prefer S. Moving up an- 
other level, now RI would expect R2 to take move S, so R1 should prefer move 
GI, which, going up the hierarchy will again cause R2 to prefer S. The choices of 
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R1 preferring G1 and R2 preferring S progress all the way to the level right below 
the top, and R1 should thus conclude that R2 will pursue its option S, i.e., R2 will 
stay put. The best option of R1 then is to pursue G1 with its payoff of 1. 
2.1. First recursive level Rl 's  view of  its own knowledge 
Let us now see what the state of Rl 's  knowledge would be if it were to transmit 
message M1 to R2, stating: "There is GI '  behind the wall." At this point we relax 
the assumption in our previous work that messages are always truthful and always 
believed. R1 is, therefore, uncertain whether R2 will believe M1. This uncertainty 
is reflected as a branching of the hierarchy, depicted in Figure 3, at the top. The 
leR 
Figure 2. Recursive hierarchy before communication for simple example. 
/ 
.d 
Figure 3. State of Rl ' s  knowledge due to sending M1. 
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right branch corresponds to the possibility of R2 believing MI, and the left branch 
corresponds to the possibility of R2 not believing it. On the level below, R2, if it 
believed M1, will model R1 as having GI '  in its world model. If R2 did not believe 
M2, it will model R1 as not believing it, too, of course. The branching below the 
third level corresponds to R2 being aware that R1 does not know whether M1 was 
believed or not, in either case of it being true or not. 
At this stage, R1 does not have any information on whether R2 is going to 
believe M1. Consequently, the uncertainties illustrated by branching in the above 
hierarchy can be treated equiprobabilistically. ~ The result of solving the hierarchy 
is the conclusion that R2 will pursue GI '  if it believed M1, and stay still if it did 
not. Thus, the probabilities of R2's pursuing G1, GI' ,  and S, can be summarized 
by the following intentional probability distribution: P ~  = (0,0.5,0.5). The best 
option of R1, then, is to pursue G1, and the expected utilities for R1 are 3 and 1, 
for the cases of R2 believing M1 or not, respectively. These values can be used to 
compute the value of MI (recall that without communication R1 would get I) as 
being 2 and 0 in each of these cases, respectively. They can be summarized in the 
following communicative matrix, which we will call CV~],: 
R2 
B not-B 
VRI(M1) 2 0 
The options of agent R2, B and not-B, correspond to R2's believing Ml or not, 
respectively. Since, at this stage, R1 does not know whether R2 will believe MI, 
it would treat these possibilities as equiprobable and evaluate that the message 
M1 would improve the quality of the interaction and raise Rl 's  expected utility 
by 1. 
2.2. Second recursive levet--Rt's view of  R2's reasoning about M1 
As we just derived, the actions of R2 in the case of it believing M1 or not are to 
pursue GI '  or S, respectively. But will R2 decide to believe MI? R2's decision 
making will again depend on the expected payoffs it gets in each case of M 1 being 
true or not, and the likelihood that M1 is t rue? These payoffs depend on what 
R1 would do in each of these cases. If MI is true, Rl ' s  action can be predicted 
from the hierarchy in Figure 3, which results in Rl 's  best action being GI. If 
M1 is false, on the other hand, Rl 's  action can be predicted from the hierarchy in 
Figure 4. 
It is a hierarchy very similar to the one in Figure 3, with the matrix pR~ on the 
top instead P~],. This hierarchy results in the best option of R1 being G1. 
Thus, RI can see R2 as having two options: it can believe M1 or not. In either 
case of M1 being true or not, R2 knows that R1 will go G1. If R2 believes M1, it 
would pursue GI '  getting 3 if GI '  is there, and getting only 1 if GI '  is not there. 







Figure 4. State of R l ' s  knowledge after sending M1, if M1 went not true. 
If R2 does not believe M1, it would stay still and get a payoff  of 2 whether  GI '  is 
behind the wall or not. Let  us assemble these results into the following commu- 
nicative matrix, which we will call Cm: 
Nature 
M1-T M1-F 
R2 B 3 1 
not-B 2 2 
Therefore,  the decision of  R2 as to whether  to believe M1 depends in this case 
on R2's judgment on whether  M1 is actually true or not. Something that should 
be stressed about this matrix is that it represents R2's options of  believing M1 or 
not in rows, but the columns do not represent Rl ' s  options as in the cases consid- 
ered in Gmytrasiewicz,  Durfee,  and Wehe (1991a, 1991b). The columns represent 
the state of Nature instead. This is because it is not in Rl ' s  power to make M1 
true or false. 
To summarize the above analysis, R1, in its evaluation of the value of M1 on 
the first level, sees that this value depends on whether  R2 will believe it or not, 
which in turn depends on whether  R2 thinks M1 is true or no t - -based  on the 
second level. R2 may at tempt to answer this question by reasoning about R1 in 
each of these possible worlds. These considerations belong to the. third recursive 
level. 
2.3. Third recursive level--Rl's view of R2's view of R1 
On this level, R1 goes deeper  and models R2's at tempt to answer  the following 
question: Am I in the world in which M1, just  received, is ' t rue,  or am I in the 
world in which M1 is false? In answering this question, R2 can use the intention- 
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ality assumption about R1, model R1 in each of these worlds, and determine 
which of these worlds is consistent with Rl 's  action of transmitting M1. Let us 
here digress from the example and point out a limitation of our approach. It may 
happen in some cases that the hearer's attempt to judge the truthfulness of a 
message based on the fact that it was transmitted by a rational speaker does not 
lead to conclusive results because the action of a rational speaker may be consis- 
tent both with the world in which the message is true, and the world in which it 
is false. The methods that can be employed in these cases would have to rely on 
prior knowledge or the use of a suitably chosen test based on which the hearer 
can decide on the truthfulness of what it hears. 
Returning to the example, R2 sees R1 as having the options of transmitting M1 
or not. In the world in which M1 is true, Rl 's transmitting M1 would give it a 
payoff of 3 if R2 believes, or payoff of 1 if R2 does not believe, as computed 
before. Let us assemble these values into a matrix Cgl,: 
R2 
B not-B 
R1 send M1 3 1 
not-send M1 1 1 
The above matrix closely corresponds to the matrix CV~], in which the ex- 
pected utility of the message itself was summarized. The matrix CVg],, can be 
obtained from C~[, with the help of equation (1) relating the utilities of actions 
with and without communication to the value of this communication. 
In the world in which M1 is false, Rt can expect payoffs assembled in the fol- 
lowing matrix CRt: 
112 
B not-B 
R1 send M1 1 t 
not-send MI 1 1 
From the communicative matrices C, a recursive communication hierarchy, de- 
picted in Figure 5, may be assembled. 
This hierarchy fully illustrates the recursive nesting of beliefs of agent R1 and 
is similar to the action hierarchies considered in Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and 
Wehe (1991a, 1991b). The important difference lies in its analysis and method of 
solution. Let us note that, as mentioned before, the rows of matrices Cg~, and C m 
on the third level cannot be directly translated to the columns of the matrix C m. 
This is due to the fact that R2's opponent in C m is Nature, not R1, who is a player 
in both Cg~, and C m. Thus, the above hierarchy cannot be solved by directly prop- 
agating conclusions of the third level to the second level (and similarly, from fifth 
to fourth, and so on). While direct propagation is not possible, R2 can analyze the 
matrices Cgl, and C R~, note that the value of the message M 1 it just heard accord- 
ing to C m is zero, and thus conclude that only the world in which M1 is true, one 
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/ \  / \  
Cnl Cnl Cnl Cnl 
G1 t G1 ~ 
F igure  5. Recursive communication hierarchy. 
in which R1 is modeled by C~,, is consistent with R1 sending the message M1. 
In other words, R2 could see that if GI '  Were not there, it would not pay for R1 
to lie and say that GI '  is there. This observation can be used in the matrix C m to 
conclude that R2 will believe M1, and, as a final conclusion, that the value of 
message MI to R1 is equal to 2. 
The above example was quite intuitive. R1 was contemplating a true message, 
found the message's impact on R2, and was able to determine that R2 will believe 
this message despite risks of doing so. That was due to the character of the 
interaction the agents were engaged in; it would simply not make any sense for 
R1 to lie. 
3. Lying in modeling messages 
In this section, we build on the intuitions developed in the previous section to 
analyze two examples of lies in modeling messages. 
3.1. A lie that pays 
Let us consider a scenario similar to the "phantom letters" scenario considered 
in Zlotkin and Rosenschein (1990) and depicted in Figure 6. Let us say that R1 
contemplates sending a message, M2, to R2 stating, "There is a G2, worth 15, at 




R1 G1 4 4 
S 10 0 
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Cost = 6 
Location 1 
Cost = 2 
GI, worth I0 
R1 j R 2  
Cost = 10 
Figure 6. A phantom goal scenario. 
pR2 is R2's payoff  matrix without G2 there, and if R2 did not believe M2: 
RI 
GI S 
R2 GI 3 3 
S 10 0 
L'~t,~ --G2PR1 summarize R l ' s  payoffs if G2 were really at Locat ion 1: 
R1 
R2 
G1 G2 S 
G1 4 19 4 
G2 23 13 13 
S 10 15 0 
Pg~ will then contain R2's payoffs if it believed M2: 
R2 
R1 
GI G2 S 
G1 3 18 3 
G2 15 5 5 
S 10 15 0 
Rl ' s  state of  knowledge before M2 is sent can be represented by the hierarchy 
in Figure 7. 
This hierarchy does not converge directly; it flip-flops between R2's pursuing 
G1 or not as progressively deeper  levels are considered, which can be summarized 
in the following intentional probability distribution: p ~  = (0.5,0.5). The best op- 
tion of R1 is then to stay put and expect  the payoff  of 5. 3 
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Figure 8. Recursive hierarchy of RI if M2 were transmitted. 
3.1.1. First level of  recursion. On this level, RI is reasoning about its knowledge 
state, depicted in Figure 8, if it were to transmit M2. 
In the process of  analyzing this hierarchy, R1 can arrive at the unique estimate 
of  R2's behavior: m P =  (1,0). Thus, R1 estimates at this level that R2 will pursue 
goal G1 in either case of  it believing M2 or not. That leaves doing nothing as R l ' s  
best option, as before sending M2, but now with its expected payoff  of  I0! Rl ' s  
reasoning on the first level, therefore, results in an estimate of  M2's utility of  5. 
The communicative matrix, CV RI, summarizes these results: 
R2 
B not-B 
VRI(M3) 5 5 
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3.1.2. Second level. A t  the second level, R1 can reason about R2's options to 
believe M2 or not, and the payoffs it expects in each case. R2's action if it believes 
M2 can be computed based on the right subtree of the hierarchy in Figure 8. Its 
analysis results in the best option of R2 being the pursuit of G1. If  R2 does not 
believe M2, its knowledge is represented by the left subtree in Figure 8. Its anal- 
ysis reveals that the best option R2 has in this case is also to pursue G1. This 
somewhat  surprising conclusion arises since R2 knows that R1 will stay still after 
transmitting M2, even if it does not know whether  M2 was believed. Thus, R2 is 
best off pursuing G1 even if it thinks that M2 is a lie. 4 If  M2 is true, R2 would 
expect  R1 to pursue G2, and its own pursuit of  G1 would result in the total payoff  
of 18. If M2 is false, R2 will get only 3. These values can be summarized in com- 
municative matrix Cm: 
Nature 
M2-T M2-F 
R2 B 18 3 
not-B 18 3 
As the above matrix shows, it really does not matter  for R2 whether  it should 
decide to believe M2 or not, since both options offer the same payoffs. Since its 
choices do not matter, R2 does not have any incentive to extend its analysis to 
deeper  levels (other than to possibly find out if R1 is a liar or not, which does not 
matter  for this particular case). 
3.2.3. Third level. If  R2 were to engage in considerations on the third recursive 
level, it would discover that it pays for R1 to transmit M2 both in the case when 
it is a lie and when it is true. The communicative payoff  matrices it would then 
construct  for R1 corresponding to the cases of M2 being true and being false, 




R1 send M2 23 13 
not-send M2 13 13 
C RI is: 
R2 
B not-B 
R1 send M2 10 10 
not-send M2 5 5 
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3.2. A lie that  does  not  pay  
In this subsection, we summarize an example [see Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee 
(1992) for details] very similar to the one considered in the previous subsection, 
with a slightly different assignment of values to the goals and their costs, as de- 
picted in Figure 9. We assume that RI contemplates sending a message, M3, to 
R2 stating, "There is a G3, worth 4, at Location 1." 
The four payoff matrices describing the decision-making situations of agent R1 
in the cases of M3 being true or not, and of agent R2 if it believed M3 or not, can 
be constructed just as in the preceding subsection. Also, the hierarchies of the 
payoff matrices can be built analogously. 
The analysis of the hierarchy that describes the state of Rl 's  knowledge before 
sending M3 reveals that Rl 's  best option in this case is to pursue G1 with the 
payoff of 2. It also turns out that R1, engaged in reasoning at the first level, would 
conclude that even if it were to send M3, pursuing goal G1 would remain its best 
option with its payoff of 2, and thus sending M3 does not pay off. The result of 
the analysis on the second level, during which R1 considers R2's options of be- 
lieving M3 or not, is that M3 would not be believed. This conclusion changes when 
the third level is entered, since it would become clear for R2 that sending M3 does 
not pay off for R1 in the case when G3 is not at Location 1. Consequently, the 
reasoning on the third level leads to the conclusion that M3 would be believed. 
The fourth level reverses this conclusion again, and a pattern becomes apparent 
according to which the analysis of the recursive communicative hierarchy flip- 
flops from level to level. As we mentioned before, our suggestion of a way out of 
this impasse coincides with one described in Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and Wehe 
(1991b) for the case of action hierarchies. The recursive analysis simply does not 
provide a conclusive answer in this case, beyond telling R1 that R2 will either 
believe M3 or not. Treating these possibilities as equally likely, R1 would finally 
conclude that it is the best for it to pursue G1, and that transmitting M3 does not 
pay off. 
Location 1 
G1, worth 3 
O 
Cost -- 1 
R1 J R 2  
Cost --- 3 
Figure 9. A variation of phantom goal scenario. 
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3.3. Discussion 
The examples above, of the lie that pays and of the lie that does not pay, show 
how the parameters of the particular interaction the agents are involved in impact 
their communicative decisions. In the first example, the hearer, R2, is left vir- 
tually without a choice; it muse pursue the goal it knows about no matter whether 
it really believes in the phantom goal or not. In the second example, on the other 
hand, R1 could not expect R2 to believe the phantom goal message and concluded 
that it does not pay to lie to R2. 
Let us also point out another interesting feature of the first example of a lie that 
pays (for R1). Note that, without communication, if both agents used the RMM 
algorithm, they would both conclude that staying still is better than pursuing goal 
G1. In this situation, goal G1 would be left unattended altogether, while both 
agents are being rational. This situation is similar to one arising in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game, in which two rational players choose a defecting move and are 
left with a meager payoff (section 5). Also note that if both agents decided to 
pursue GI without communication, the cumulative cost would outweigh the value 
of achieving G 1. 
4. Lying and belief in intentional messages 
An intentional message expresses a commitment, by the agent that transmits the 
message, to an action. 5 Apart from the fact that an intentional message impacts 
the speaker and the hearer differently than a modeling message, our analysis here 
will be very similar to the case of modeling messages. The speaker will attempt 
to assess the value of a given intentional message, which in general will depend 
on whether the hearer believes it. The hearer, on the other hand, will attempt to 
guess the truth value of the received message by wondering if it pays for the 
speaker to stick to its expressed commitment or not. 
Let us first consider a scenario depicted in Figure 10. 
G1, worth 2 (32, worth 5 
~ %  Cost = 2 I ~  
f 
I Cost = 1 "~ Icost - 1 
I I "~ I 
1 Cost = 2 ~. 
R1 R2 
Figure 10. Example of interacting agents. 
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RI's payoff matrix will be called pRl: 
R1 
R2 
G1 G2 S 
G1 1 6 1 
G2 5 3 3 
S 2 5 0 
pR2 will contain R2's payoffs: 
R2 
R1 
G1 G2 S 
G1 0 5 0 
G2 6 4 4 
S 2 5 0 
The recursive hierarchy containing Rl 's  knowledge before communication 
takes place is depicted in Figure 11. 
The solution to the above hierarchy for R2's intentional probability distribution 
is: p~ = (0.25,0.5,0.25), which results in the expected utilities of Rl 's options G1 
and G2 being both 3.5. Rl 's option S has expected utility of 3, so R1 cannot 
hope for more than 3.5 without communication. Let us see how R1 can better 
its utility by sending a truthful intentional message, M1, saying "I will pursue 
GI ."  
pR1 
Figure 11. Recursive hierarchy before communication. 
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4.1. First recursive level 
At this level R1 will analyze the state of  its knowledge resulting from sending M 1, 
and at tempt to assess Ml ' s  utility. Let  us introduce a payoff  matrix, R2 PM~, of  R2, 




R2 G2 6 
S 2 
The recursive hierarchy of  R1 after sending MI is depicted in Figure 12. The 
right branch corresponds to the possibility that the hearer believes the message 
and thus does not have to engage in modeling the speaker at a deeper  level to 
predict its intentions. 
The result of  solving this hierarchy for the intentional probability distribution 
of  R2 is: R1 P 2 = (0,1,0), which means that R l ' s  best option is G1 with its expected 
utility of  6. Thus, if R2 believes M1, it will pursue G2, but even if it does not 
believe M1, it will still pursue G2. The summary of Rl ' s  assessment of  the value 
of M1 at this stage will be called CVm: 
R2 
B not-B 




Figure 12. Recursive hierarchy of RI after MI was sent. 
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At this point, R1 loses interest in whether R2 will believe M1 or not since Rl 's  
payoffs do not depend on these possibilities. The value of M1 to R1 can be estab- 
lished at 2.5. If, for academic purposes, R1 did consider R2's decision making 
about whether to believe M1 or not, it would notice that R2 does not care about 
Ml's truthfulness either. 
5. Communicat ion in Prisoner's Dilemma game 
We will now turn to the issue of agents engaged in the game of Prisoner's Dilemma 
(PD) considering communicating their intentions. Prisoner's Dilemma is an ab- 
straction of many different real-life situations, ranging from trench warfare to evo- 
lutionary genetics (Axelrod 1984), Traditionally, game theorists do not analyze the 
PD game in the context of the players communicating because it is considered 
that communication in this game is either useless or dishonest. Our aim in this 
section is to show that these assumptions can be derived using our approach. 
Let us call the payoff matrix of the player I in the PD matrix U: 
II 
c d 
I C 3 0 
D 5 1 
pn will be the corresponding matrix of player II: 
! 
C D 
II c 3 0 
d 5 1 
Further, let us define P~-c as: 
I 
C 
II c 3 
d 5 
and P~-D as: 
I 
D 
II c 0 
d 1 
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The rational choice of  a move  in a one-shot  play of  PD without communicat ion  
is to move D for player I, and d for player  II. Let  us say that player  I considers 
sending an intentional message,  called U S E L E S S ,  that states " I  will choose  D . "  
The state of  knowledge of player  I can then be depicted as the hierarchy in 
Figure 13. 
After analyzing this hierarchy, player  I has to conclude that P~; = (0.1), i.e., 
p layer  II will choose d whether  it believes U S E L E S S  or not. That  means that the 
best option of  player I is D, with its payoff  of  1, and the value of  U S E L E S S  is 0. 
Going down the recursive levels does not make the value of U S E L E S S  any dif- 
// 
p I  
# 
/ .  
P//-/D 
Figure 13. Recursive hierarchy of player I after USELESS was sent. 
S 
/ 
p i  





Figure 14. Recursive hierarchy of player I after DISHONEST was sent. 
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ferent than 0, since there ,~s no way that player II would be convinced by USE- 
LESS to choose c. 
Let  us instead, then, consider another intentional message that player 1 may 
consider. It would state "I  will choose C."  Let  us call this message DISHONEST.  
Player I's state of knowledge on the first recursive level is included in figure 14. 
Again, we have: p~ = (0,1), i.e., player II chooses his move D whether  it be- 
lieved D I S H O N E S T  or not. Given that fact, D is player I's best choice, and, as 
rational, player I would choose it, which earns D I S H O N E S T  its name. Were 
player I to go deeper  into the recursive levels, he would conclude that player II 
will never believe DISHONEST,  of course. 
The two messages above exhaust player I's choices of intentional messages, 
and there are no other messages of importance it can consider further. Player I 
will therefore conclude that it does not pay to talk to player II at all. 
6. Discussion and future work 
Allowing the possibility that messages can be lies and disbelieved adds a substan- 
tial amount of overhead to the computation of  expected values of candidate mes- 
sages. The analysis of each of the recursive levels now requires the solution of  at 
least one newly created action hierarchy. Furthermore,  fairly complex reasoning 
was often necessary to propagate the results of the recursive levels upward. This 
complexity would make the routines that rigorously employ the ideas presented 
here more costly. 
The examples considered in this article were intended to illustrate both the 
power and the limitations of  our approach. For  the senders of  potential messages, 
it was always possible to assess the value of both modeling and intentional mes- 
sages. On the hearer 's  side, however,  we showed that our approach may not suf- 
fice to make a decision on whether  to believe the incoming information for mod- 
eling messages in certain situations. These circumstances may render the 
recursively applied intentionality assumption useless, and other means may have 
to be employed. 
In some cases, the messages that we analyzed turned out to be not worth send- 
ing. That  points to the possibility that the agents will not find any suitable mes- 
sages to exchange at all, as we showed in the case of the Prisoner 's  Dilemma. 
That simply means that interactions between agents in these situations will be 
silent. 
We find it interesting to consider the results of this article in the context  of the 
following example. Let  us imagine a rich and dynamic environment populated by 
autonomous,  heterogeneous agents. We think that the insights gained in this ar- 
ticle can be used to predict that some agents will turn out to converse a great deal, 
while not communicating with the others. The fact that communication is likely 
to be repetitive brings about questions, already explored in Gmytrasiewicz,  Dur- 
fee, and Wehe (1991b) for decision making about physical actions, about how 
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repetition will influence the whole idea of lies and belief. We think that it is fairly 
safe to qualitatively extend the results obtained in Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and 
Wehe (1991b) to these issues. Thus, just as repetitive interactions facilitates co- 
operation of the agents in their choice of physical action, so, too, will it promote 
cooperative traits in communication. That means that agents who communicate 
repetitively will tend to tell the truth to each other and to trust each other, while 
"outsiders" will likely be lied to and not believed. 
Our future research will attempt to formalize more fully the process of analyz- 
ing communicative payoff hierarchies. We also hope to apply these formal meth- 
ods to the cases of repeated communication which should allow us to perform 
exhaustive testing of the hypothesis that repetitive communication would allow 
honesty and trust to spontaneously arise in societies of selfish, rational agents. 
Notes 
l, We use here the principle of indifference to represent the lack of knowledge by a uniform prob- 
ability distribution, which contains no information. That, of course, does not preclude the pos- 
sibility that other knowledge might be available. If it were, it would be represented as a proba- 
bility distribution and used here instead. 
2. We discount here the possibility that the hearer might choose to believe a message because it 
would be good if it were true as irrational. Of course, acting as if it were true based on the 
expected utility of doing so can be rational, as we will see. 
3. As we remark in Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee, and Wehe (1991b), the inability of the analysis to 
converge on a unique solution simply means that the information contained in the hierarchy is 
inconclusive. While a conclusive answer is obviously desirable, we must avoid the temptation 
to have the system imply that it can conclude more than it should. Thus, rather than jump to a 
conclusion, and perhaps use ad hoc methods to program agents to jump to the same conclusion, 
we prefer to explicitly represent and use the uncertainty about conclusions. 
4. This situation is similar to the following everyday" occurrence. Both you and your friend want a 
certain thing done, but it seems that it would be somewhat more convenient for him to do it. He 
knows that, and you know that he knows, but at a certain point he says that he has something 
else, much more important, to do. Now, you think it is just an excuse and you do not really 
believe him, but the bottom line is that he will not do what you had previously assumed. Thus, 
the only option you have is to do it yourself, even if you thought that the excuse was a lie. 
5. The intention can also be probabilistic. An agent can, for instance, express its intention to pur- 
sue two of its options with probabilities 0.3 and 0.7. 
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